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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter 
pursuant to § 78-2-2 Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Did the trial court err and abuse its discretion in failing to 
set aside the Default Judgment entered against Appellant Douglas M. 
Baum (hereafter Baum) in favor of Appellee Toby Slingerland 
(Slingerland) under the circumstances of Baum's mistaken 
understanding of the situation and excusable neglect at the time 
the Default was entered and in light of the fact that Slingerland 
did not claim prejudice should the Default be set aside. 
The standard of review is whether or not under the 
circumstances the trial court abused its description in denying 
Baum's Motion to Set Aside the Default and Default Judgment. Birch 
V. Birch. 771 P.2d 1114 (Utah App. 1989). 
RULES AND STATUTES WHICH ARE DETERMINATIVE OF THE 
ISSUES SET FOR REVIEW 
Rule 60(b) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (set forth in the 
Addendum). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This action is a personal injury claim filed by Slingerland 
against Baum resulting from a one-car rollover causing serious 
injury to Slingerland. Slingerland filed his action against Baum 
on January 31, 1992 (R. 2-4), and a Default was entered against 
Baum on May 18, 1992 (R. 9). On June 16, 1992, a hearing was held 
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on the issue of damages, as a result of which a Default Judgment 
was entered against Baum in the amount of $5,623,839.00. 
(R. 17-19). On September 11, 1992, Baum filed a timely Motion to 
Set Aside the Default and Default Judgment. (R. 169-170). 
Subsequent to Memoranda having been filed and reviewed by the 
court, the court denied Baum's Motion to Set Aside the Default. 
(R. 207, 218-220). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. June 1, 1991—Baum and Slingerland made a late night trip 
from Salt Lake City to Wendover, Nevada. Both Baum and Slingerland 
had gone a substantial period of time without sleep prior to their 
return trip to Salt Lake City and both were very tired. Baum and 
Slingerland mutually decided to have Baum drive back home. 
Slingerland put his seat back, took off his seat belt, and went to 
sleep. Shortly before the accident Slingerland woke up, noted that 
Baum had fallen asleep, yelled at Baum, Baum over-corrected his 
steering, the vehicle went down a ravine, and rolled causing injury 
to Slingerland. (R. 0256-0257). 
2. Shortly after the accident Baum contacted USF&G Insurance 
Company (USF&G) notifying them of the accident and requesting 
coverage. USF&G informed Baum that they would not cover this 
accident. (R. 177). 
3. January 31, 1992—Slingerland filed a lawsuit against 
Baum seeking damages for injuries sustained in the accident. 
(R. 2-4). 
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4. Baum had never before been involved in any litigation, 
was unsophisticated in connection with legal matters and did not 
have a very good understanding of how the legal process works. 
(R. 177). 
5. Baum discussed the matter of the lawsuit with an attorney 
who informed him that under the circumstances, Baum was probably 
liable and that his best option may be to file bankruptcy. Baum 
also spoke to Slingerland's attorney and as a result of such 
conversations was of the impression and understanding that 
Slingerland's attorney would try to work things out with Baum's 
insurance company to satisfy Slingerland's claim. (R. 177). 
6. Subsequently, Baum was served with a Summons and 
Complaint. Baum did not inform anyone concerning service of the 
Summons and Complaint due to the fact that Baum was of the 
understanding that he had no insurance coverage and therefore, no 
viable options, and due to the emotional stress of being sued by 
his best friend who was now a paraplegic. As a further result of 
discussions with an attorney and Slingerland#s attorney, Baum was 
in a confused state of mind and did not know what he should do. 
Under the circumstances, as a result of a mistake in judgment and 
excusable neglect, Baum took no action to respond to the Summons 
and Complaint. (R. 177). 
7. May 18, 1992—Default was entered against Baum. (R. 9). 
8. June 16, 1992—Subsequent to a two-hour hearing, a 
Default Judgment was entered against Baum in the amount of 
$5,623,839. (R. 234-313, and R. 17-19). 
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9. Shortly before the hearing of June 16, 1992, USF&G, which 
was in the process of preparing for a declaratory action on the 
issue of coverage for Baum, was informed that a Default had been 
entered against Baum and that a hearing would be held on the issue 
of damages. USF&G retained the services of Gary Johnson who 
appeared at the hearing of June 16, 1992 on behalf of USF&G, to 
monitor the hearing. Mr. Johnson did not take part in the hearing. 
(R. 237-238). 
10. July 9, 1992—A Declaratory Action was filed in the 
United Stated District Court, District of Utah, Civil No. 2-92-CV-
611J concerning the issue of insurance coverage for Baum in 
connection with the accident. 
11. September 11, 1992—Counsel had been retained for Baum by 
USF&G and a Motion to Set Aside the Default and Default Judgment 
was filed with an accompanying Memorandum of Authorities and 
Affidavit of Douglas M. Baum. (R. 169-170, 171-175, and 176-179). 
12. Baum's Motion to Set Aside the Default and Default 
Judgment was based upon the fact that Baum took no action to 
prevent judgment to be entered against him due to his emotional and 
confused state and his mistaken understanding that he had no viable 
options at the time. Baum in the furtherance of justice and equity 
requested that the Default be set aside and that he be given the 
opportunity to defend the issue of sole liability and the damage 
claims. (R. 169-170, 171-175, and 176-179). 
13. September 22, 1992— Slingerland filed a Memorandum 
opposing setting aside the Default, asserting claims and arguments 
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against USF&G and not Baum, as a basis for opposing setting aside 
the Default. (R. 180-196). 
14. Slingerland in his Motion opposing setting aside the 
Default, did not claim that he would be prejudiced should the 
Default be set aside. (R. 180-196). 
15. September 28, 1992—Baum filed a Response Memorandum in 
support of setting aside the Default. (R. 197-201). Baum also 
filed a Request for Hearing on the matter. (R. 202-203). 
16. October 19, 1992—The court denied Baum's Motion to Set 
Aside the Default and Default Judgment. The court also denied 
Baum's Request for Oral Argument. (R. 0207). 
17. October 21, 1992—Baum filed a Rule 52 Motion and 
Objection in connection with the proposed Order seeking entry of 
specific Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, requesting that 
the court provide further details as to what facts and law the 
court relied on in its denial of Defendant's Motion to Set Aside 
the Default and Default Judgment. (R.210-211). 
18. December 1, 1992—The court signed an Order denying 
Baum's Objection to the proposed Order and request for entry of 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. (R. 217-219). 
19. December 21, 1992—Baum filed the Notice of Appeal. 
(R.-221). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
It is a well established principle of law that justice 
requires both sides of a controversy to have a fair opportunity to 
be heard. Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
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recognizes that at times Defaults will be entered under 
circumstances where justice dictates and requires that the Default 
be set aside. In this case, the trial court abused its discretion 
in failing to set aside the Default. The Motion to Set Aside the 
Default and Default Judgment was timely made. Baum's mistaken 
understanding, confusion and emotional distress at the time the 
Default was entered constitutes grounds as mistake or excusable 
neglect under Rule 60(b) to set the Default aside. Plaintiff did 
not claim prejudice should the Default be set aside. Baum has a 
good faith defense that Slingerland's injuries are not 100 percent 
the fault of Baum and that Slingerland should be responsible for 
his proportionate share of fault. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DESCRIPTION 
IN FAILING TO SET ASIDE THE DEFAULT 
AND DEFAULT JUDGMENT ENTERED AGAINST 
DOUGLAS M. BAUM 
POINT I 
THE MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE DEFAULT AND DEFAULT 
JUDGMENT WAS TIMELY FILED 
Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires that 
a Motion to Set Aside a Default and Default Judgment which was 
entered due to mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect must be 
filed not more than three months after the Judgment was entered. 
The Default Judgment in this matter was entered on June 16, 1992. 
The Notice of Appeal was filed on September 11, 1992, within the 
required 90 days. 
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POINT II 
DEFAULT JUDGMENTS ARE IN DISFAVOR AND DO 
NOT MEET THE ENDS OF JUSTICE 
The courts in Utah have traditionally disfavored the entry of 
Judgments by Default for the obvious reason that both sides of the 
controversy have not been heard. Entry of Judgment by Default 
denies a defendant the chance to present his side of the story, to 
present a defense, and to fairly and equitably examine a 
plaintiff's damage claims. 
In Westinghouse Electric Supply Company v. Larsen Contractor, 
Inc.P 544 P.2d 876, 879 (Utah 1975), the court held: 
. . . But it is even more important to keep in 
mind that the very reason for the existent of 
courts is to afford disputants an opportunity 
to be heard and to do justice between them. 
In conformity with that principle the courts 
generally tend to favor granting relief from 
default judgments where there is any 
reasonable excuse unless it will result in 
substantial prejudice or injustice to the 
adverse party. (Emphasis added). 
In Heathman v. Fabin & Clendenin, 377 P.2d 189, 190, 14 Utah 
2d 60 (Utah 1962), the court held: 
Judgments by default are not favored by the 
courts nor are they in the interest of justice 
and fair play. No one has an inalienable or 
constitutional right to a judgment by default 
without a hearing on the merits. The courts 
in the interest of justice and fair play 
favor, where possible, a full and complete 
opportunity for a hearing on the merits of 
every case. 
In May v. Thompson
 f 677 P.2d 1109 (Utah 1984), a case 
involving an 18 year old defendant who also, through some confusion 
and mistake, allowed a Default Judgment to be entered against him, 
the court held: 
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We are aware also of a principle that if 
default is issued when a party genuinely is 
mistaken to a point where, absent such 
mistake, default would not have occurred, the 
equity side of the court would grant relief. 
. • . We are of the opinion that the ends of 
justice require an opportunity for the 
defendant to have his day in court. 
In Helgesen v. Inyangumia, 636 P.2d 1079 (Utah 1981), the 
court held: 
The decision to relieve a party from a final 
judgment under Rule 60(b)(1) is subject to the 
discretion of the trial court. But discretion 
should be exercised in furtherance of justice 
and should incline toward granting relief in a 
doubtful case to the end that the party may 
have a hearing. Warren v. Dickson Ranch 
CompanyP 123 Utah 416, 260 P.2d 741 (1953). 
We reiterated in Olsen v. Cummings, Utah, 565 
P.2d 1123 (1977), the statement made by the 
court in Mayhem v. Standard Gilsonite Companyf 
14 Utah 2d 52, 376 P.2d 951 (1962) that "it is 
quite uniformly regarded as an abuse of 
discretion to refuse to vacate a default 
judgment where there is reasonable 
justification or excuse for the defendant's 
failure to appear and timely application is 
made to set it aside." . . . We hold that the 
lower court abused its discretion in refusing 
to set aside the default judgment under the 
circumstances presented in this case. 
(Emphasis added). 
Under the circumstances of this case, justice and equity 
demand that the Default be set aside and that Baum be allowed to 
have his day in court. At the time the Default was entered, Baum 
was a young man 22 years of age with no experience in the legal 
system. He was suffering emotional distress, due to being sued by 
his best friend who was now paraplegic as a result of an automobile 
accident in which Baum was the driver. Baum was in a state of 
confusion, partly as a result of conversations with attorneys, one 
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of whom advised him that he had little option but to declare 
bankruptcy, and SIingerland's attorney who advised him that action 
was being taken with USF&G on the issue of coverage and payment of 
Slingerland's claim. Previously, he had been informed by USF&G 
that they would not cover him in connection with this accident and 
he certainly did not think he could provide his own defense. It is 
not difficult to see that at the time, Baum mistakenly felt that he 
had no options, but to do nothing. Baum's confused state of mind 
under the circumstances constitutes "excusable neglect." 
Appellant respectfully submits that Rule 60(b) was intended 
specifically for persons such as Baum who, because of their 
inexperience and confusion, mistaken judgment and excusable 
neglect, have allowed a Default Judgment to be entered against 
them, but where equity and justice favor allowing such as 
defendant, who has made a timely request to set the default aside, 
to have his day in court. 
It is important to note that the court's basis for denying 
Baum's Motion to Set Aside the Default and Default Judgment was 
that: 
All concerned were aware of the proceedings, 
or reasonably could have been with proper 
attention . . . (R. 0207). 
Appellant respectfully submits that the court's Ruling is in 
error. The fact that a defendant was aware of the proceedings and 
in hindsight "could" have responded, can be equally applied to 
every party seeking to set aside a Default. Under the trial 
court's standard, (the fact that a defendant was aware of a pending 
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Complaint and "could" have responded,) no Default would ever be set 
aside and Rule 60(b) would become meaningless. 
Although Baum arguably "could" have taken action to prevent ' 
the entry of Default, the fact remains that he did not take any 
action due to his emotional state and confusion and to his mistaken 
understanding of the situation which, under the circumstances, 
constitute excusable neglect within the intent of Rule 60(b). 
POINT III 
PLAINTIFF WILL NOT BE PREJUDICED IF 
THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT IS SET ASIDE 
In Westinghouse Electric Supply Company v. Larsen Contractor,. 
Inc.P infra, the court stated in part: 
. . . Courts generally tend to favor granting 
relief from default judgment where there is 
any reasonable excuse, unless it will result 
in substantial prejudice or injustice to the 
adverse party. (Emphasis added). 
It is significant to note that at no time in plaintiff's 
Memorandum Opposing Setting Aside the Default did Slingerland claim 
or allege or offer any evidence of "prejudice" should the Default 
be set aside. (R. 180-196). It would be improper and untimely for 
Appellee to raise the issue of prejudice for the first time now on 
Appeal. 
POINT IV 
BAUM HAS A MERITORIOUS DEFENSE 
TO SLINGERLAND'S CLAIM 
Although this court has held that the merits of a case should 
not be an issue in a Motion to Set Aside a Default (Board of 
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Education v. Cox, 14 Utah 2d 385, 384 P.2d 806 (Utah 1963) and 
Larsen v. Collinaf 684 P.2d 52 (Utah 1984)), it should be noted 
that Baum does have a meritorious defense that justice require he 
be allowed to present. The fact is that both Baum and Slingerland 
had been out late at night and without sleep for a substantial 
period of time on a trip to Wendover. As a result of this activity 
and outing, Slingerland and Baum were both very tired and by mutual 
decision decided to return home without any rest or sleep. 
Slingerland had been angry that in the past he was always having to 
drive his car and insisted on this trip that Baum do the driving. 
(R. 0256-0257). Instead of taking steps to assist Baum in staying 
awake, Slingerland took off his seat belt, put his seat back, and 
went to sleep. As he woke up and noticed that Baum had apparently 
fallen asleep, Slingerland exacerbated the situation by yelling, 
thus apparently startling Baum, resulting in Baum over-correcting 
in attempting to keep the vehicle under control which resulted in 
the accident and injuries to Slingerland. 
Baum should be given the opportunity to have a jury assess the 
relative fault of Baum and Slingerland in their mutual decision to 
spend a considerable amount of time staying awake, their mutual 
decision to drive back to Salt Lake from Wendover without sleep and 
to weigh the subsequent actions of the parties, which eventually 
resulted in the accident causing Slingerland's injuries. 
Further, as to economic damages and future medical care, the 
court based its $4.6 million special damages award on the brief 
testimony of Paul Randle (R. 0242-0252) which was accepted without 
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significant inquiry by the court and without any cross-examination. 
Finally, Slingerland's serious injury likely would not have 
occurred had he been wearing his seat belt. 
Justice and equity require that Baum be given an opportunity 
to provide a defense to this claim to have the jury assess the 
relative fault of the parties, and to appropriately examine 
Slingerland's damage claims. 
POINT V 
SLINGERLAND'S ATTACKS AGAINST 
USF&G WERE IMPROPER 
In response to Baum's Motion to Set Aside the Default and 
Default Judgment, Slingerland filed a Memorandum entitled 
"Memorandum in Opposition to USF&G/s Motion to Set Aside Default 
and Default Judgment." (Emphasis added). Slingerland then argues 
in his Memorandum that "USF&G" has failed to meet the requirements 
necessary to set aside a Default, that "USF&G" has not met its 
burden to show that the Default was entered as a result of a 
mistake, etc., that "USF&G's" Motion was untimely, that "USF&G" has 
failed to meet its burden to show that Baum has a meritorious 
defense, and that "USF&G" has failed to meet any of the 
requirements necessary to set aside a Default under Rule 60(b)(7). 
(R. 180-196). Slingerland then argues that "USF&G's" attorney, 
Gary Johnson, appeared at the damages hearing of June 16, 1992, 
that "USF&G," therefore, had the opportunity to participate in the 
damage hearing and refused to do so. 
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This line of argument is a classic example of setting up and 
then knocking down a "straw man." The Motion to Set Aside the 
Default was filed by Baum not USF&G. USF&G was not a party to that 
Motion, nor did it have any involvement in that Motion other than 
retaining counsel for Baum, presumably under its obligations to 
defend its insured even when there is a dispute as to coverage. 
Slingerland, in his Memorandum, continually attacks "USF&G" in 
connection with setting aside the Default and for its failure to 
affirm coverage for Baum in connection with the accident. 
Slingerland blatantly and erroneously asserts that the Motion to 
Set Aside the Default and the arguments in favor of said Motion 
were all made by "USF&G" and not Baum. (R. 180-196). 
Not only were Slingerland's "straw man" attacks against USF&G 
improper, apparently they were also successful. In denying Baum's 
Motion for the entry of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
the trial court stated: 
The court declines to further enter Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Mr. Olsen's 
response [the Memorandum attacking USF&G] in 
behalf of the plaintiff is sufficient. 
(R. 0217). 
The trial court erred and abused its discretion in failing to 
set aside the Default and Default Judgment against Baum under the 
provisions of Rule 60(b) and compounded that error by stating that 
the basis for denying Baum's Motion was Slingerland's "straw man" 
attack against USF&G, a non-party in this case. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Default and Default Judgment in this case, entered against 
Baum in the amount of almost $6 million, took place at a time that 
Baum was emotionally distraught, extremely confused and of the 
mistaken understanding that he had no choice and no options other 
than to do nothing. Due to this excusable neglect, the Default 
Judgment was entered against him. When informed of his mistake, 
Baum filed a timely Motion to Set Aside the Default and Default 
Judgment. Slingerland never claimed prejudice should the Default 
be set aside and instead, proceeded with attacks against USF&G as 
a basis for denying Baum's Motion. 
The courts in Utah have always disfavored Default Judgments. 
In this instance, Baum should have the opportunity to defend the 
claim of sole liability for Slingerland's injuries and damages. 
Rule 60(b) was intended for situations such as Baum's and the trial 
court erred and abused its discretion in failing and refusing to 
set the Default and Default Judgment aside. 
DATED this 26th day of March, 1993. i 
KIPP 
endant/Appe11ant 
Baum 
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ADDENDUM 
1. Rule 60(b) 
2. Default Certificate 
3• Judgment 
4. Motion to Set Aside Default and Default Judgment 
5. Memorandum of Authorities in Support of Motion to Set Aside 
Default and Default Judgment 
6. Affidavit of Douglas M. Baum 
7. Memorandum in Opposition to USF&G's Motion to Set Aside 
Default and Default Judgment 
8. Response Memorandum to Plaintiff's Memorandum Opposing Setting 
Aside Default and Default Judgment 
9. Minute Entry Denying Motion to Set Aside Default and Default 
Judgment 
10. order Denying Motion to Set Aside Default and Default Judgment 
11. objection to Proposed Order 
12. Minute Entry Denying Defendant's objection to Proposed Order 
13. Order Denying Defendant's Objection to Proposed Order 
14. Notice of Appeal 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 26th day of March, 1993, I caused 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing Appellant's Brief to be 
mailed, postage prepaid, to the following: 
David R. Olsen, Esq. 
Jesse C. Trentadue, Esq. 
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSON 
175 South West Temple, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1480, 
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J?y 
Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order. 
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or othui 
jarts of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may 
ye corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of 
my party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the pen-
iency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is 
docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending 
may be so corrected with leave of the appellate court. 
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newiy discovered evi-
dence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may 
in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a 
final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence 
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a 
new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrin-
sic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; 
(4) when, for any cause, the summons in an action has not been personally 
served upon the defendant as required by Rule 4(e) and the defendant has 
failed to appear in said action; (5) the judgment is void; (6) the judgment has 
been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is 
based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that 
the judgment should have prospective application; or (7) any other reason 
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made 
within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), (3), or (4), not more than 3 
months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A 
motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or 
suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to enter-
tain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or pro-
ceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure for 
obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these 
rules or by an independent action. 
T? 
DAVID R. OLSEN, ESQ. (2458) 
JESSE C. TRENTADUE, ESQ. (496!) 
of and for 
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSON 
175 South West Temple, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1480 
Telephone: (801) 532-7300 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL U1S1K1CI COURT WW '•.'. I. I I '. KT. COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
TOBY SCOTT SLIN> 
Defendant. 
DEFAULT CERTIFICATE 
(" ' " 92-0900571PI 
Judge: Leslie A. Lewis 
OOUGLAS M. BAUM, having been regularly served with process in this 
action, and having failed to appear and answer the plaintu, * Lo.:.r~ ; 
time allowed by law for answering having expired, the default of defendant, DOUGLAS M. 
BAUM, is hereby entered according to law. 
ATTEST my „„.«.. - / # day of 
IW2. 
By: t'/lAlfjAJ / / . KL&Q-
DR018.94 
I , i l l 
DAVID R. OLSEN, E$g. (z<*3oj , I * . -
JESSE C. TRENTADUE, ESQ. (4961) ^ 
of and for ^ j ' 
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG * 11AII' .* -N 
175 South West Temple, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1480 
Telephone: (801) 532-7300 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN i /IE DTIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE ('(MINTY 
r J \ KTWCSoi 
uiHV' *Ji o n ' •?! INGERLAND, ) ^ ^ S ( ^ i T ^ ^ ^ 
) JUDGMENT 
) 
) 
vs ) 
) Civil No. 920900571PI 
LAS M. BAUM, ) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
This matter came on for trial June 16, 1992 on the _<jurt 
heard the testimony or witnesses -uul I<\ nv Plaintiff waived the need ""—rt 
to make Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Now, being f"1 ^. ,, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ftlulnu >l n '.I'III (n I 'HFKD Uul the plaintiff Toby Sum 
Slingerlanu w,inlr<1 judgment against the defendant Douglas M. Baum as follows: 
Special damages: $4,6.''•, \>''" H). 
General damages. SI.000.000.00. 
Total damages: $5.623.839.00. 
This judgment shall bear interest at the rate of 12% per annum from the date of entry until paid 
in full. 
DATED this / 7 ^ " day of June, 1992. 
DAVID S. Y 
Judge, Third 
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HEINZ J. MAHLER, ESQ. - #3832 
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendant 
City Centre I, #330 
175 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2314 
Telephone: (801) 521-3773 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TOBY SCOTT SLINGERLAND, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DOUGLAS M. BAUM, 
Defendant. 
MOTION TO SET ASIDE 
DEFAULT AND DEFAULT JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 920900571PI 
Judge David S. Young 
Defendant, Douglas M. Baum, by and through his counsel, Heinz 
J. Mahler, Esg., of Kipp and Christian, P.C, hereby moves this 
court pursuant to the provisions of Rule 60(b)(1) (7), Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, to set aside the default and default judgment 
entered on or about June 16, 1992. 
This Motion is based upon the accompanying Memorandum of 
Authorities and Affidavit of Douglas M. Baum which establishes that 
the judgment should be set aside and the matters at issue litigated 
in the interest of justice and fairness. 
DATED this *fo day of September, 1992. 
KIPP ANDCpRISTIAN, P.C. 
Attorney/for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAIEJNg 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the [(Htx- day of September, 1992, 
I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing MOTION TO SET 
ASIDE DEFAULT AND DEFAULT JUDGMENT to be mailed, postage prepaid, 
to the following: 
David R. Olsen, Esq. 
Jesse C. Trentadue, Esq. 
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSON 
175 South West Temple, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1480 
§yLL^$L<\ J . Avi OtJL 
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HEINZ J. MAHLER, ESQ. - #3832 
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendant 
City Centre I, #330 
175 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2314 
Telephone: (801) 521-3773 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TOBY SCOTT SLINGERLAND, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DOUGLAS M. BAUM, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM OF AUTHORITIES IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION TO SET 
ASIDE DEFAULT AND DEFAULT 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 920900571PI 
Judge David S. Young 
Defendant, Douglas M. Baum (Baum), submits the following 
Memorandum of Authorities in Support of his Motion to Set Aside the 
Default and Default Judgment of June 16, 1992: 
FACTS 
1. On June 1, 1991, defendant, Douglas M. Baum, was 
driving a 1981 Subaru near Delle, Utah, with a passenger, Toby 
Slingerland, the plaintiff. The automobile was involved in a one 
car rollover as a result of which the plaintiff was seriously 
injured. 
2. On January 31, 1992, plaintiff filed this action 
against Baum seeking damages for injuries sustained in the accident 
in question. 
3. Baum failed to answer or otherwise respond to the 
Complaint filed against him due to Baum's understanding that no 
insurance company would cover the claim and that he had no 
reasonable alternative. (Affidavit of Douglas M. Baum) 
4. A Certificate of Default was entered May 18, 1992 
and, subsequent to a hearing, a Default Judgment was entered on 
June 16, 1992, in the amount of $5,623,839.00. 
ARGUMENT 
Rule 60(b) contemplates setting aside judgments such as 
this on the basis of mistake, inadvertence, excusable neglect, or 
other reasons in the furtherance of justice and equity. In this 
matter, Baum is being sued by his friend due to severe injuries 
sustained by Slingerland in a one car rollover accident. At the 
time an Answer or other response was due by Baum, Baum understood 
that no insurance company would cover the claim in question or 
provide a defense on his behalf. Baum is 22 years old, has never 
been sued before, and is not sophisticated as to issues of law. 
The attorney he consulted advised him that liability was likely and 
that bankruptcy may be his best alternative. Baum felt sorrow for 
the injuries his friend sustained. Accordingly, under the 
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circumstances, Baura took no action and the default and default 
judgment were entered. 
The injuries claimed by Slingerland are substantial and 
serious. Defendant respectfully submits that it does not further 
the interest of justice and equity to allow a default judgment of 
$5.6 million to stand without having both sides of the controversy 
heard. It would be in the further interest of justice and equity 
to introduce evidence as to whether or not the acts or omissions on 
the part of Baum which resulted in the accident constitute 
wnegligence11 or other "fault" resulting in liability on the part of 
Baum for Slingerland's damages and injuries. It is further in the 
interest of justice to litigate specifically the nature and extent 
of the plaintiff's injuries giving defendant a fair opportunity to 
examine the treating physicians of the plaintiff, to have indepen-
dent evaluations by other physicians concerning plaintiff's future 
care and treatment, as well as examining the economic damages such 
as lost wages and earning capacity, etc. 
Baum took no action in responding to the Complaint in 
part because of his understanding that no insurance company was 
willing to provide coverage or provide a defense. At present the 
matter of insurance coverage for Baum in connection with this claim 
is the subject of litigation in the matter entitled USF&G v. Baum, 
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et al, filed in the United States District Court, District of Utah, 
Civil No. 2-92-CV-611J. (Affidavit of Douglas M. Baura) 
The courts in Utah and elsewhere have traditionally 
disfavored the entry of judgments by default. Entry of judgment by 
default denies a defendant to present his side of the story, to 
present a defense, and to fairly and equitably examine the 
plaintiff's damage claims* 
In Westinahouse Elec. Supply Co. v. Larsen Contractor, 
544 P.2d 876, 879 (Utah 1975), the court stated: 
. . . courts generally tend to favor granting 
relief from default judgment where there is 
any reasonable excuse, unless it will result 
in substantial prejudice or injustice to the 
adverse party, 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant, Douglas M. Baum, respectfully requests an 
opportunity to be heard, to present a defense to the claim of 
liability against him, and the opportunity to examine the plaintiff 
and his treating physicians and other witnesses in connection with 
his claim for damages. These matters are in dispute, an actual 
controversy exists as to these issues, and justice and equity would 
be better served if both sides have an opportunity to be heard in 
a matter involving a $5.6 million claim. Accordingly, defendant 
respectfully requests that the default and default judgment, 
entered less than 90 days ago, be set aside, that defendant be 
-4-
allowed to answer the Complaint and provide a defense to the 
allegations in question. 
»4 34h day of September, 1992. 
TIAN, P.C. 
HLER, ESQ. 
or Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the /ffi^ day of September, 1992, 
I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum of 
Authorities in Support of Motion to Set Aside Default and Default 
Judgment to be mailed, postage prepaid, to the following: 
David R. Olsen, Esq. 
Jesse C. Trentadue, Esq. 
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSON 
175 South West Temple, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1480 
sQ^^h/ A^ (AM4^ 
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HEINZ J. MAHLER, ESQ. - #3832 
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C 
Attorneys for Defendant 
City Centre I, #330 
175 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2314 
Telephone: (801) 521-3773 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TOBY SCOTT SLINGERLAND, : AFFIDAVIT OF 
: DOUGLAS M. BAUM 
Plaintiff, : 
vs. : Civil No. 920900571PI 
DOUGLAS M. BAUM, : Judge David S. Young 
Defendant. : 
(State of Utah ) 
: ss 
(County of Salt Lake ) 
I, Douglas M. Baum, being first duly sworn, depose and state 
as follows: 
1. I am the defendant in this lawsuit and have personal 
knowledge concerning the matters testified of herein. 
2. On June 1, 1991, I was driving my car with Toby 
Slingerland as a passenger. I momentarily fell asleep, the car 
rolled, and Toby Slingerland was seriously injured in the accident. 
3. Shortly after the accident, I contacted USF&G Insurance 
Company notifying them about the accident and requesting coverage* 
4. I was informed by USF&G that they would not cover this 
accident. 
5. Subsequently, I was served with a Summons and the 
Complaint in this lawsuit. 
6. Because I was told that there was no coverage and because 
the lawsuit was filed against me by my best friend, I felt that 
there was nothing that I could do and, therefore, under the 
circumstances, I took no action. 
7. I have never been sued before and I do not fully 
understand how the legal process works. 
8. I talked to Dave Olsen, Toby Slingerland's lawyer, and as 
a result of these conversations, I was of the understanding that he 
would try to work things out with the insurance company as to 
coverage for Toby SIingerland's claim. 
9. I also talked to a lawyer who advised me that liability 
is almost certain and that since the claim does not involve conduct 
that is non-dischargeable, that probably my best option would be to 
eventually file for bankruptcy. 
10. Judgment was entered against me on June 16, 1992. I did 
not take any action to prevent judgment from being entered because 
I did not believe I had any viable options. 
2 
11. Subsequently, a lawsuit has been filed by USF&G against 
me and a Counterclaim has been filed by me in the case entitled 
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company vs. Douglas M. Baumr et 
al. and Douglas M- Baum, and Douglas H. Baum vs. USF&G. in the 
United States District Court, District of Utah, Civil No. 
2-92-CV-611J, as to whether or not I have insurance coverage. 
12. With the situation now changed, and in order to protect 
my interests, I am asking that the default judgment be set aside 
and that I be given the opportunity to defend myself and let a jury 
decide whether or not my actions constitute negligence. I would 
also like an opportunity to have my attorney examine the evidence 
and if appropriate, present my own witnesses on the damage claim of 
Toby Slingerland. 
13. Further, affiant saith naught. 
Dated this '1»V day of September, 1992. 
.* -'-SUBSCRIBEDJ^H£«ORN TO before me this \l-tU^ day of September, 
• ^~.^\ Notary Pubflo ! 
173 East 400 South 1330 I 
My Commission Expires: LJAAs*~4rC~ M2l 
s) , I ~ o Notary Publ ic 
"l'$lCi? Residing at:
 <£jb* £Ju, Uv^Jry^-
3 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 11th day of September, 1992, I 
caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing Affidavit of 
Douglas M. Baum to be mailed, postage prepaid, to the following: 
David R. Olsen, Esq. 
Jesse C. Trentadue, Esq. 
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSON 
175 South West Temple, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1480 
fc*x^L~ Ad 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
TOBY SCOTT SLINGERLAND, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DOUGLAS M. BAUM, 
Defendant. 
Civil No. 920900571PI 
Judge: David S. Young 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
USF&G'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE 
DEFAULT AND DEFAULT JUDGMENT 
DAVID R. OLSEN, ESQ. (2458) 
JESSE C. TRENTADUE, ESQ. (4961) 
of and for 
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSON 
175 South West Temple, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1480 
Telephone: (801) 532-7300 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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Plaintiff, Toby Slingerland, is a twenty-one-year-old quadriplegic. Toby 
Slingerland, while riding as a passenger, was paralyzed in a single-car accident on June 
1, 1991. Defendant Douglas M. Baum was the driver of that car. Baum drove off the 
highway and his car overturned. On January 31, 1992, Toby Slingerland sued Douglas 
Baum for the injuries which he sustained in that accident. 
Douglas M. Baum failed to answer or otherwise enter a defense to Toby 
Slingerland's Complaint. Baum's decision not to appear and answer was based upon the 
actions of his insurance carrier. Douglas M. Baum's insurance carrier is United States 
Fidelity & Guaranty Company (MUSF&G"). Baum was insured under a USF&G policy 
with limits of $100,000.00. USF&G three times denied coverage to Douglas M. Baum 
for the accident in which Toby Slingerland was paralyzed. Consequently, Baum assumed 
there was nothing he could do under the circumstances and he took no action to defend 
against the Complaint. 
But Baum's decision was not made in a vacuum. He consulted an attorney 
who advised Baum that liability was "almost certain." Thus, rather than appear and 
defend at his own expense, Baum opted to allow default to be entered and to eventually 
file for bankruptcy. Default was entered against Baum by this Court on May 18, 1992. 
On June 16, 1992, a trial on the issue of Toby Slingerland's damages was 
held before this Court. After hearing the testimony of witnesses and receiving exhibits 
into evidence, this Court entered judgment in favor of Toby Slingerland for 
- 1 -
$5,623,839.00. USF&G attended the June 16, 1992 trial. During that trial, this Court 
repeatedly offered USF&G the opportunity to participate in those proceedings. USF&G, 
however, refused the offer. 
On July 9, 1992, USF&G brought an action for declaratory relief against 
Douglas M. Baum, his father Douglas H. Baum, and Toby Slingerland in the United 
States District Court for the Central District of Utah. USF&G brought that action 
seeking a ruling from the federal court that it had no coverage or defense obligations to 
Douglas M. Baum and his father Douglas H. Baum with respect to Toby Slingerland's 
claims. On August 18, 1992, Douglas M. Baum and his father counterclaimed in that 
federal court action against USF&G. In that counterclaim, the Baum's are seeking 
damages for USF&G's bad faith in refusing to settle Toby Slingerland's claims for the 
policy limits of $100,000.00. 
Immediately after that counterclaim was filed, USF&G retained counsel to 
represent Douglas M. Baum before this Court. Through this counsel, USF&G has filed 
a Motion to Set Aside Default and Default Judgment. Toby Slingerland is submitting this 
Memorandum in opposition to USF&G's "Motion to Set Aside Default and Default 
Judgment." 
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I. 
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS 
Set out hereinbelow in separately numbered paragraphs are the material facts 
which this Court needs to consider in ruling on USF&G's Motion. Prior to reviewing 
those facts, however, the Court needs to be aware of the background of law against which 
these facts must be considered and weighed. Specifically, the law developed under Utah 
Rule Civil Procedure 60(b)(1) and (7). 
A. Utah Rules Of Civil Procedure 60<Wn And CD. 
USF&G has moved under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1) and (7) to set 
aside the Certificate of Default and Judgment entered by this Court against Douglas M. 
Baum. Rule 60(b) provides that this Court "may in the furtherance of justice" 
relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order or proceeding for 
the following reasons: "(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable 
neglect;" . . . "or (7) any other reason justifying relief from the operation 
of the judgment." Utah Rules Civ. Pro. 60(b)(1) and (7). (Emphasis added). With 
respect to motions brought under Rule 60(b)(1), they must be brought "not more than 
three months after the judgment, order or proceeding was entered or taken." Utah R. 
Civ. P. 60(b). Motions brought under Rule 60(b)(7) must be brought within a reasonable 
time. The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly stated, however, that a motion under Rule 
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60(b)(7) may not be used to circumvent the three-month filing period for "mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect under Rule 60(b)(1). In other words, if the 
Motion should have been brought within three months of the entry of the order or 
judgment, a defendant cannot extend that time period by captioning its Motion as a Rule 
60(b)(7) Motion rather than a Rule 60(b)(1) Motion. See Larsen v. Collina, 684 P.2d 
52 (1984). 
In order to prevail on its Motion under Rule 60(b)(1), USF&G must show 
that the Certificate of Default and/or Judgment was entered against Douglas M. Baum 
through mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect, that its Motion is timely and 
that Baum has a meritorious defense to Toby Slingerland claims. £g£ State by and 
through D. ofS.S. v. Musselman, 667 P.2d 1053, 1055-56 (Utah 1983). To prevail on 
its Motion brought under Rule 60(b)(7), USF&G must show that the reason for setting 
aside the Certificate of Default and/or Judgment is one other than those listed in 
subdivisions (1) through (6) of Rule 60(b); that this other reason is sufficient to justify 
relief from the Certificate of Default and/or Judgment; and that its Motion was brought 
within a reasonable time after entry of the Certificate of Default and/or Judgment. 
Finally, whether it is proceeding under Rule 60(b)(1) or Rule 60(b)(7), USF&G has the 
burden of establishing the grounds for setting aside the Certificate of Default and/or 
Judgment by "clear and convincing evidence/ Salle v. Howe, 151 P.2d 154, 
155 (Colo. App. 1988). 
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B. Material Facts. 
1. On June 1, 1991, Douglas M. Baum was driving a car in which Toby 
Slingerland was a passenger. Baum drove off the road and the car rolled over. Toby 
Slingerland became a quadriplegic as a result of injuries he received in that accident. 
Toby Slingerland^ condition is permanent and will require extensive future medical and 
maintenance costs. 
2. In the Affidavit of Douglas M. Baum — the only evidence that 
USF&G submits in support of its Motion — Baum states that shortly after the accident, 
he contacted USF&G notifying them about the accident and requesting coverage. Baum 
further states he: "Was informed by USF&G that they would not cover this 
accident." (Baum Affidavit, ff 3 and 4). (Emphasis added). 
3. Baum also states in his Affidavit that he was subsequently served with 
Toby Slingerland's Summons and Complaint; and that because he already had been told 
by USF&G that there was no coverage, "I felt that there was nothing I could 
do." Consequently, Baum says he "took no action." (Baum Affidavit 1 6). 
(Emphasis added). 
4. Baum nonetheless asks in his Affidavit that "a jury [be allowed to] 
decide whether or not my actions constitute negligence." But Baum offers no evidence 
that would relieve him of responsibility for this accident. Instead, Baum admits liability 
stating that he was the driver of the car and that H[I] momentarily fell asleep, the car 
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rolled and Toby Slingerland was seriously injured in the accident." (Baum Affidavit, 5 
2). Baum likewise requests an opportunity for his USF&G counsel to "examine the 
evidence and if appropriate, present my own witnesses on the damage claim of Toby 
Slingerland." (Baum Affidavit, f 12). Again, Baum does not state what if any evidence 
he intends to proffer on the issue of Toby Slingerland's damages. 
5. Baum states in his Affidavit that USF&G denied coverage for Toby 
Slingerland's claim. Baum neglects to include in his Affidavit the fact that USF&G 
attended the June 16, 1992 trial and that during the trial USF&G was given the 
opportunity by this Court to participate. 
6. USF&G subsequently brought an action for declaratory relief against 
Douglas M. Baum, his father Douglas H. Baum and Toby Slingerland in the United 
States District Court for the Central District of Utah on July 9, 1992. In that action, 
USF&G is asking the federal court to declare that it owed no coverage or defense 
obligations to the Baums with respect to Toby Slingerland's claims. 
7. The Baum's counterclaimed against USF&G on August 18, 1992. 
In their Counterclaim, Douglas M. Baum and Douglas H. Baum sued USF&G for the 
insurance carrier's bad faith refusal to settle Toby Slingerland's claims for the 
$100,000.00 policy limit. 
- 6 -
n. 
ARGUMENT: USF&G HAS FATT.Fn TO 
MEET ANY OF THE REQUIREMENTS 
NECESSARY FOR THIS COURT TO 
SET ASIDE THE DEFAULT A N D 
JUDGMENT UNDER RULE 60(b)(1) 
In order for USF&G to prevail on its Rule 60(b)(1) Motion, it must show: 
[T]hat the judgment was entered against him through 
excusable neglect (or any other reason specified in 
Rule 60(b)[l]), . . . that his motion to set aside the 
judgment was timely; and (3) that he [Baum] has a 
meritorious defense to the action. 
Musselman, 667 P.2d at 1055-56. USF&G must meet this burden with "clear and 
convincing evidence." Salle, 757 P.2d at 155. (Emphasis added). But USF&G has 
failed to meet its burden of proof with respect to all three elements required to set aside 
a judgment or order under Rule 60(b)(1). 
A. USF&G Has Not Met Its Burden To Show That The Default 
And/Or Judgment Were Entered As A Result Of Mistake, 
Inadvertence, Surprise, or Excusable Neglect On The Part Of 
Douglas M. Baum. 
The only evidence USF&G offers to show mistake, inadvertence, surprise 
or excusable neglect is the Affidavit of Douglas M. Baum. Yet the facts stated in Baum's 
Affidavit do not rise to the level of a mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect 
sufficient for this Court to vacate orders and/or judgments under Rule 60(b)(1). Baum, 
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for example, states in his Affidavit that he was told by USF&G that there was no 
coverage. Hence, he "felt that there was nothing that I could d o / (Baum 
Affidavit, f 6). (Emphasis added). 
Baum also states in his Affidavit — and it is an important admission — that 
before making the decision to do nothing he: 
[A]lso talked to a lawyer who advised me that 
liability is almost certain and that since the claim 
does not involve conduct that is non-dischargeable, that 
probably my best option would be to eventually file for 
bankruptcy. 
(Baum Affidavit, \ 9). (Emphasis added). Baum thus weighed the option of going to the 
personal expense of hiring an attorney to defend himself on a claim of liability he now 
admits "is almost certain" against saving the cost of an attorney by not appearing and 
defending and then later discharging the Judgment through bankruptcy. Baum's decision 
not to appear and defend was thus an informed, reasoned choice, which hardly constitutes 
mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect. 
Moreover, Baum was placed in the position of making that choice because 
of USF&G's wrongful denial of coverage. While USF&G may not now be happy with 
Baum's choice to do nothing, this insurance company had ample opportunity to intervene 
on Baum's behalf prior to entry of the Judgment but knowingly chose not to. Having 
made that choice, USF&G cannot go back and undo its decision under the guise of 
"mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect." At best, the facts which USF&G 
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puts forth in support of its Rule 60(b)(1) Motion show indifference and a lack of diligence 
on its part, which are not grounds for vacating a Judgment or Order of this Court. See 
Russell v. Martell, 681 P.2d 1193, 1195 (Utah 1984) (affirming entry of default judgment 
in similar case in which defendant felt no need to respond to the Complaint filed against 
him). 
B- USF&G's Motion To Set Aside The Certificate Of Default 
Is Untimely. 
Rule 60(b)(1) is clear on its face. A motion to set aside an order or other 
proceeding on the basis of mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect must be 
brought "not more than three months after the judgment, order or proceed-
ing was entered or taken/ Utah Rule Civ. P. 60(b)(1). (Emphasis added). In the 
instant case, the Certificate of Default was entered on May 18, 1992, but USF&G's 
Motion was not filed until September 11, 1992. USF&G's Motion to Set Aside the 
Default was not filed until almost four months after entry of default and, therefore, this 
Court lacks jurisdiction to vacate that order of default under Rule 60(b)(1) upon the 
defendant meeting the standards set forth in Utah Rule Civ. P. 60(b)(1). 
C. USF&G Has Failed To Meet Its Burden To Show That 
Baum Has A Meritorious Defense. 
The third element which USF&G must meet in order to prevail on its Rule 
60(b)(1) Motion is a showing that Douglas M. Baum has a meritorious defense to Toby 
- 9 -
Slingerland's claims. This USF&G has not done. Nor could USF&G do so under the 
facts in this case. Douglas M. Baum clearly states in his Affidavit that he went to sleep 
and drove off the road (Baum Affidavit, S 2) and that he was advised by his attorney that 
"liability is almost certain.11 (Baum Affidavit, 1 9). (Emphasis added). USF&G 
offers no facts to contradict this admission. Rather than a proffer of evidence showing 
a meritorious defense to Toby Slingerland's negligence claims, Baum simply states in his 
Affidavit that he now desires "the opportunity to defend myself and let a jury decide 
whether or not my actions constitute negligence.M (Baum Affidavit, f 12). 
Similarly, Baum offers in his Affidavit no indication of a meritorious 
defense to Toby Slingerland's damage claims. Baum instead simply states in conclusory 
fashion that: 
I would like also an opportunity to have my 
attorney examine the evidence and if appropriate, 
present my own witnesses on the damage claim of 
Toby Slingerland. 
(Baum Affidavit, 1 12). (Emphasis added). USF&G does not say what evidence it 
would present on Baum's behalf in contradiction of Toby Slingerland's damage claims. 
Furthermore, the existence of any such evidence is indeed doubtful. The Court will 
recall the powerful testimony and other evidence of Toby Slingerland's damages that were 
presented during trial, and having heard this evidence the Court knows that it cannot be 
contradicted. 
- 10-
in. 
ARGUMENT: USF&G HAS FAILED TO MEET 
ANY OF THE REQUIREMENTS NECESSARY 
FOR THIS COURT TO SET ASIDE 
THE DEFAULT AND JUDGMENT 
UNDER RULE 60(b)(1) 
USF&G has likewise moved to set aside the Default and Judgment on the 
basis of Rule 60(b)(7), This rule allows the Court to vacate orders and judgments for 
"any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.M Utah Rule Civ. 
Pro. 60(b)(7). Rule 60(b)(7) is not, however, a substitute for motions brought under Rule 
60(b)(1). See Russell, 681 P.2d at 1195 (Rule 60(b)(7) may not be resorted to for relief 
when the ground asserted falls within Rule 60(b)(1)). In fact, the "any other reason 
justifying relief language of 60(b)(7) is actually the residuary clause under which 
USF&G must show: 
[TJhat the reason [for relief] . . . [is] one other than 
those listed in subdivisions (1) through (6); . . . that 
the reason[s given] justify relief; and . . . that the 
motion . . . [was] made within a reasonable time. 
Thorpe v. Jensen, 817 P.2d 382, 387 (Utah App. 1991). 
USF&G also has the burden of establishing grounds for relief under Rule 
60(b)(7) with "clear and convincing evidence.w Salle, 757 P.2d at 155. (Emphasis 
added). But once more USF&G has not met its burden. USF&G offers no evidence 
showing "any other reason justifying relief" under Rule 60(b)(7). More importantly, the 
- 11 -
Utah Court of Appeals has cautioned that in applying Rule 60(b)(7) lower courts should 
proceed "very cautiously;" that these grounds for vacating orders and judgments should 
be used "sparingly;" and that relief from orders and judgments under Rule 60(b)(7) 
should occur "only in unusual and exceptional circumstances." Thorpe v. Jensen, 817 
P.2d at 387 (Utah App. 1991). In the instant case, USF&G has failed to identify any 
reason justifying the relief it requests. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
USF&G has failed to meet its burden of proof on the Motion to Set Aside 
Default and Default Judgment. USF&G has failed to provide the Court with clear and 
convincing evidence of mistake, inadvertence, surprise, excusable neglect or any other 
reason justifying relief under Rules 60(b)(1) and (7) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
With respect to the Certificate of Default, USF&G's Motion is likewise untimely, having 
been brought more than three months after that default was entered. Lastly, USF&G has 
failed to make any showing that Baum has a meritorious defense to the underlying action. 
- 12-
DATED this 22nd day of September, 1992. 
> ^ 
f-
rid R. Olsen, Esq, 
Jesse C. Trentadue, Esq. 
of and for 
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSON 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
to be hand-delivered this 22nd day of September, 1992, to: 
Heinz J. Mahler, Esq. 
KIPP & CHRISTIAN, P.C. 
City Centre I, Suite 330 
175 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2314 
r-i 
JCT59.38 
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Tab 8 
HEINZ J. MAHLER, ESQ. - #3832 
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendant 
City Centre I, #330 
175 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2314 
Telephone: (801) 521-3773 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TOBY SCOTT SLINGERLAND, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DOUGLAS M. BAUM, 
Defendant. 
RESPONSE MEMORANDUM TO 
PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM 
OPPOSING SETTING ASIDE 
DEFAULT AND DEFAULT JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 920900571PI 
Judge David S. Young 
Defendant Douglas M. Baum submits this Response to 
Plaintiff's Memorandum Opposing Setting Aside the Default and 
Default Judgment: 
ARGUMENT 
It should first be noted that plaintiff's Memorandum is 
entitled Memorandum in Opposition to "USF&G's" Motion to Set Aside 
Default and Default Judgment. The entire memorandum contains 
arguments against "USF&G", concluding with the statement that 
"USF&G" has failed to meet its burden and that "USF&G's" Motion to 
Set Aside the Default and Default Judgment should be denied. USF&G 
is not a party in this lawsuit. The Motion to Set Aside Default 
and Default Judgment was filed by Douglas M. Baum, the defendant, 
and not USF&G. Since the entire memorandum is directed against 
USF&G and not against the defendant who is seeking to set aside 
this default, all arguments in the memorandum are without merit, 
are directed against a non-party, and should not be considered by 
this court. 
The Affidavit of defendant Douglas M. Baum honestly and 
clearly presents to the court the circumstances, under which a 
default judgment was entered. Mr. Baum is a young man who was 
faced with a situation where he was being sued by his best friend 
who had sustained serious injuries in an auto accident. Mr. Baum 
is unsophisticated in connection with legal matters and has never 
been involved in a lawsuit. Mr. Baum was advised by USF&G that no 
coverage was provided for this claim. As a result of conversations 
with Dave Olsen, plaintiff's attorney, Mr. Baum was of the under-
standing that Mr. Olson would attempt to work things out with USF&G 
in connection with coverage for Toby SIingerland's claim. In 
reviewing this matter with an attorney, Mr. Baum was advised that 
liability was almost certain and that perhaps his best option would 
be to eventually file for bankruptcy. Given these facts as a 
whole, it is not difficult to understand why when subsequently 
served with a Summons and Complaint, that Mr. Baum took no action 
and allowed the default judgment to be entered against him, which 
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situation constitutes excusable neglect on the part of Mr. Baum and 
was due in part to mistaken beliefs on the part of Mr. Baum. 
Litigation is now pending between Mr. Baum, USF&G, and 
others as to whether or not the claim of Mr. Slingerland is covered 
by a policy of insurance. Defense counsel has now been retained 
for Mr. Baum and thus, Mr. Baum respectfully requests that this 
court allow him to proceed with reasonable discovery and put on a 
reasonable defense. 
In his memorandum, plaintiff claims that Baum has failed 
to provide any "evidence" as a basis for challenging liability or 
damages. This argument is, however, without basis in logic. Baum 
cannot provide any evidence unless he is given an opportunity to 
proceed with discovery. There is no doubt that the plaintiff 
suffered significant damages. However, the extent of those damages 
has only been presented by one side. Mr. Baum should have the 
opportunity to cross-examine the treating physicians and other 
witnesses that will testify or have knowledge concerning Mr. 
Slingerland's injury and how it will effect the balance of his 
life, as well as all witnesses in connection with economic damages. 
Mr. Baum should have the opportunity, if appropriate, to provide 
his own witnesses on the issue of medical and economic damages. 
Plaintiff also claims that Mr. Baum does not have a 
meritorious defense. That is a question that should be left for a 
-3-
jury to decide. Although Mr. Baum was driving the vehicle at the 
time of the accident, Mr. Baum and Mr. Slingerland jointly agreed 
and decided to make a late night trip to Wendover, both decided to 
go a substantial period of time without sleep, and it was by 
agreement that Mr. Baum was driving at the time the accident. The 
factors which contributed to Mr. Baum falling asleep resulting in 
the accident were joint decisions by both Mr. Slingerland and Mr. 
Baum. The causes which resulted in the accident were the result of 
mutual agreements. A jury should have the opportunity to determine 
whether or not Mr. Slingerland is partially at fault and to what 
degree for the causes that resulted in the accident. Further, it 
should be a question for the jury as to whether or not Mr. Baum's 
falling asleep under the circumstances rises to the level of 
"negligence" under instructions to be given to a jury. 
Mr. Baum's Motion to Set Aside the Default and Default 
Judgment was made within 90 days of the time that the Default 
Judgment was entered and within a reasonable time of the Default 
Certificate having been signed by the clerk of the court. 
Plaintiff has not shown, nor has he even claimed in his Memorandum, 
any prejudice that would result if the default is set' aside. 
Plaintiff's claim will still be viable. It would be subject to 
proof and cross-examination. Mr. Baum respectfully submits that it 
would be in the interest of justice to set aside the default 
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judgment in light of the facts as outlined above and in light of 
the substantial amount of damages at issue and that he be given an 
opportunity to provide a defense to this claim. Defendant's Motion 
to Set Aside the Default and Default Judgment should, therefore, be 
granted• 
DATED this <3S day of September, 1992. 
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C. 
1, ESQ. 
Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF WAIXJNq 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ppfcCday of September, 1992, 
I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing Response 
Memorandum to Plaintiff's Memorandum Opposing Setting Aside Default 
and Default Judgment to be mailed, postage prepaid, to the 
following: 
David R. Olsen, Esq. 
Jesse C. Trentadue, Esq. 
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSON 
175 South West Temple, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1480 
<^4JL^A^ J^ iffyt X f l - ^ ^ 
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Tab 9 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SLINGERLAND, TOBY SCOTT 
PLAINTIFF 
VS 
BAUM, DOUGLAS M 
DEFENDANT 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NUMBER 920900571 PI 
DATE 10/07/92 
HONORABLE DAVID S. YOUNG 
COURT REPORTER 
COURT CLERK NP 
TYPE OF HEARING: 
PRESENT: 
P. ATTY. OLSEN, DAVID R. 
D. ATTY. MAHLER, H.; JOHNSON, G.; 
SWORN AND EXAMINED 
OTHERS; JACKSON, W. K. 
THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT 
ENTERED IS DENIED. THE COURT HAS REVIEWED THE PLEADINGS AND IS 
CONVINCED THAT THERE IS NO APPROPRIATE BASIS UNDER RULE 60 (B) 
TO GRANT THE MOTION. ALL CONCERNED WERE WELL AWARE OF THE 
PROCEEDINGS, OR REASONABLY COULD HAVE BEEN WITH PROPER ATTENTION 
AND THUS THE MOTION IS DENIED. MR. OLSEN IS REQUESTED TO 
PREPARE AN ORDER CONSISTENT HEREWITH AND WITH HIS PLEADINGS. 
ORAL ARGUMENT ON THE MOTION IS DENIED. THE COURT FEELS 
THAT THE MATTER HAS BEEN FULLY BRIEFED AND CAN BE THUS SUBMITTED 
ON THE PLEADINGS. 
C.C. TO COUNSEL 
Tab 10 
DAVID R. OLSEN, ESQ. (2458) 
JESSE C. TRENTADUE, ESQ. (4961) 
of and for 
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSON 
175 South West Temple, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1480 
Telephone: (801) 532-7300 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
TOBY SCOTT SLINGERLAND, ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ) 
DOUGLAS M. BAUM, ] 
Defendant. ] 
I ORDER 
) Civil No. 920900571PI 
1 Judge: David S. Young 
Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Default and Default Judgment was duly 
considered by the Court. The parties filed memoranda and affidavits in support of their 
respective positions. The Court being fully advised in the premises, it is hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that Plaintiffs Motion to Set Aside 
Default and Default Judgment be, and the same hereby is, denied. 
DATED this _ / 2 _ _ l _ day of October, 1992. 
BY THE COURT: 
M 
DAVID S. YOUNG 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing to 
be mailed, first chss postage prepaid, this ft day of October, 1992, to: 
Heinz J. Mahler, Esq. 
KIPP & CHRISTIAN, P.C. 
City Centre I, Suite 330 
175 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2314 
Gary L. Johnson, Esq. 
RICHARDS BRANDT MILLER & NELSON 
50 South Main, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
W. Kevin Jackson, Esq. 
JENSEN, DUFFIN, CARMAN, DIBB & JACKSON 
311 South State, Suite 380 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
>r<%: _ 
DRO20.ll 
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Tab 1.1 
HEINZ J. MAHLER, ESQ. - #3832 
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendant 
City Centre If #330 
175 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2314 
Telephone: (801) 521-3773 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DJ STRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TOBY SCOTT SLINGERLAND, : OBJECTION TO PROPOSED 
: ORDER 
Plaintiff, • 
vs. : 
DOUGLAS M. BAUM, : Civil No, 920900571PI 
Defendant• : Judge David S. Young 
Defendant Douglas M. Baum objects plaintiff #s proposed 
Order denying defendant's Motion to Set Aside Default a.MJ Default 
Judgment, which Order has been submitted by plaintiff. This 
Objection is based upon the fact that the Order is not sufficiently 
definite and clear In outlining the court's basis and facts relied 
upon in denying the Motion to Set Aside the Default and Default 
Judgment. 
This court ; its discretion under Rule S2, Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, ente, specific Findings of fact dud 
Conclusions of Law Defendant respectfully r< quests that the court 
enter specific Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law providing in 
detail the facts upon which the court relied and based its denial 
of defendant's Motion to Set Aside the Default and Default 
Judgment. 
DATED this day of , 1992. 
JSTIAN, P.C. 
ER, ESQ. 
for Defendant 
CgRTIFICATB QF HMMWg 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the <^LJ~day of October, 1992, 
I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing Objection to 
Proposed Order to be mailed, postage prepaid, to the following: 
David R. Olsen, Esq. 
Jesse C Trentadue, Esq. 
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSON 
175 South West Temple, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1480 
IS/UL^SU.. A'j ^^A^~K._ 
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Tab 1J 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SLINGERLAND, TOBY SCOTT 
PLAINTIFF 
VS 
BAUM, DOUGLAS M 
DEFENDANT 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NUMBER 920900571 PI 
DATE 11/05/93 
HONORABLE DAVID S. YOUNG 
COURT REPORTER 
COURT CLERK NP 
TYPE OF HEARING: 
PRESENT: 
P. ATTY. OLSEN, DAVID R. 
D. ATTY. MAHLER, HEINZ J. 
THE NOTICE TO SUBMIT DEFENDANT'S "OBJECTION TO PROPOSED 
ORDER" HAS BEEN FILED NOVEMBER 2, 1992. THE COURT DECLINES TO 
FURTHER ENTER FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW. 
MR. OLSEN'S RESPONSE IN BEHALF OF THE PLAINTIFF IS SUFFICIENT. 
THE OBJECTIONS ARE DENIED. MR. OLSEN IS REQUESTED TO PREPARE 
AN ORDER CONSISTENT HEREWITH AND WITH HIS PLEADINGS ON FILE. 
C.C. TO COUNSEL 
Tab 13 
DAVID R. OLSEN, ESQ. (2458) 
JESSE C. TRENTADUE, ESQ. (4961) 
of and for 
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSON 
175 South West Temple, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1480 
Telephone: (801)532-7300 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
TOBY SCOTT SLINGERLAND, ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ; 
DOUGLAS M. BAUM, ) 
Defendant. ] 
I ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
I OBJECTION TO PROPOSED ORDER 
i Civil No. 920900571PI 
i Judge: David S. Young 
Defendants Objection to the Proposed Order was filed in this Court on October 
21, 1992. A Notice to Submit was filed on November 2, 1992. The Court being fully advised 
in the premises, it is hereby ORDERED: 
1. Defendant's Objection to the Proposed Order is denied. 
2. The Order Denying Plaintiffs Motion to Set Aside Default and Default 
Judgment shall be deemed signed and entered effective as of the date of this Order Denying 
Defendant's Objection to Proposed Order. 
DATED this I day of ^ November, 1992. 
BY THE COURT: 
HONORABLE DAVID S. YOUNG 
- 2 -
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing to 
be mailed, first class postage prepaid, this 12th day of November, 1992, to: 
Heinz J. Mahler, Esq. 
KIPP & CHRISTIAN, P.C. 
City Centre I, Suite 330 
175 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2314 
Gary L. Johnson, Esq. 
RICHARDS BRANDT MILLER & NELSON 
50 South Main, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
W. Kevin Jackson, Esq. 
JENSEN, DUFFIN, CARMAN, DIBB & JACKSON 
311 South State, Suite 380 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
DRO20.26 
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Tab 14 
HEINZ J. MAHLER, ESQ. - #3832 
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendant 
175 East 400 South, #330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2314 
Telephone: (801) 521-3773 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TOBY SCOTT SLINGERLAND, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DOUGLAS M. BAUM, 
Defendant. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Civil No* 920900571PI 
Judge David S. Young 
Notice is hereby given that defendant and appellant, Douglas 
M. Baum, through counsel, Heinz J. Mahler of Kipp and Christian, 
P.C, appeals to the Utah Court of Appeals the Default and Default 
Judgment entered against defendant on June 17, 1992 and final Order 
denying defendant's Motion to Set Aside Default and Default 
Judgment entered in this matter on October 19, 1992. Defendant's 
Rule 52(b) Motion filed in connection with said Order was denied on 
December 1, 1992. 
The Appeal is taken from the entire judgment. 
DATED this 1ft4** day of December, 1992. 
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C. 
Hein^HJl tffflftler 
Attorneyyfor defendant 
Douglas Baum 
CERTIFICATE QF HAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the _sE**-day of December, 1992, I 
caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing Notice of Appeal to 
be mailed, postage prepaid, to the following: 
David R. Olsen, Esq. 
Jesse C. Trentadue, Esq. 
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSON 
175 South West Temple, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1480 
W. Kevin Jackson 
JENSEN, DUFFIN, CARMAN, DIBB & JACKSON 
311 South State Street 
Suite 380 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
§^x**jl*~ /*M( 
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„ . „T*«KO F0» COST. OH « t W - < « » 
Bond #71-0160-13850-92-4 
3 1 J X « T OF THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
„ THE DISTRICT COURT OF TO 
STATE OF UTAH 
T0by Scott SUngerland 
VS. 
Plaintiff 
UNDERTAKING 
FOB 
COSTS ON APFKAL 
Case 1920900571PI 
Defendant 
Douglas M. Bauo 
WHEREAS, the Defendant 
on the 
day of 
19 . 'or 
) . coats, and interest at Percent 
^ J a r 8 ! , and from the whole thereof. tfl . and from the wnoie « > « — 
K aoDeal the undersigned, the 
hereby undertake ana i» ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^
 awarde<i agau» 
*•* * «
 M aPd?SLTnerSf.St e x ^ i n g Dollar.. <* 300.00 
Dated and signed this 8th 
19 92 . day of December • 
™ mLELlTY AND GUARANTY COMPAKY 
UNITED STATES FIDELITY A*"^S?^2^~^2) 
»w *
;::
^4-f^^^?^"""" Attorney-in-fact. 
By ^ n e t h Osborne, Aiwnwjr 
STATE OF UTAH. [ „: J ^ ^ & ! E t f & * 
EUMBETH POTTS 
8th 
tYTflsborne 
day of DecembJJ . 
0/L ,L/J? Ifethk. 
A. D. 19 92 
CERTIFIED COPY 
GENERAL POWER OF ATTORNEY 
NO..J5.2?7. 
Kncm mU M*n bf liUee Fru*nt$$ 
That UNITED STATES FIDEUTY AND GUARANTY COMPANY, a corporation organised and existing under the laws of the 
State of Maryland, and having iu principal office at the City of Baltimore, in the State of Maryland, does hereby coiutitute and appoint 
Kenneth Osborne 
#f the Qty of S a l t Lake Ci ty , State ef Utah 
iu true and lawful attorney » in and for the State of U t a h 
for the following purposee, to wit! 
To sign iu name aa surety to, and to execute, aeal and acknowledge any and all bonds, and to respectrrely do and perform any tad 
all ecu and things tot forth in the resolution of the Board of Director* of the aaid UNITED STATES FIDELITY AND GUARANTY 
COMPANY, a certified copy of which i* hereto annexed and made a pari of Ode Power of Attorney} and the said UNITED STATEScr 
FIDEUTY AND GUARANTY COMPANY, through ua» iu Board of Directors, hereby ratine* and confirm* all and whatsoever the aaid ' 
Kenneth Osborne . - - ^ \ \ vi~ 
-$•.* - - „ x • • _ _ . 
ftuy Uwinlly & la the prendsei by vlrtne \ 4 ^ \ • . Lm 
In JTtoteM Whttof, the aaid UNITED STATES FIDELITY AND GUARANTY, COMPANY hag caused thla wttrmnent to bo 
sealed with it* corporate aeal duly attested by the eignaturee of te Vioe-PreakSent and AtaiaUftt Secretary, this 1 7 t h day el 
January . A. a 19 75 
UNITED STATES FIDEUTY AND GUARANTY COMPANY. 
(Signed) * . . . . & » - * & ? & • 
Vlc+PruU**. 
( S E A L >
 (Signed)
 t..,.,W«wP..RUyaPd W f / . „ w * . „ 
STATE OP MARYLAND, 
BALTIMORE CITY, * mt } 
Assistaai Stcrttary. 
^ " O a U f r 3 . 7 t h ^ P day of J a n u a r y • * • a » 7 5 t before me personally came 
J o h n H a m i l t o n * * * ***
 f Vlen-Preeideiit cl the UNITED STATES FIDELITY AND GUARANTY 
COMPANY and W* G* H i l y a r d . Assistant Secretary of said Company, with both of 
whom I am personally acquainted, who being by me severally dnly sworn, aaid that they resided fat the City of Baltimore, Maryland; 
that they, the said John Htani l ton . end Wo 0# H i l y a r d were retpeotMr 
t h V ^ c i i ^ i d e n l and the Aedataut Secretary of the said UNITED STATES rTDEUTlUNOcCUARArfrY COMPANY, the coa> 
ooratioo described in and which executed the foregoing Power el Attorney r that they jack knew% the. seal j>( sald,corporetiott;.that jh». 
seal affixed to said Power of Attorney waVtneh corporate sealths^towaaaoraedbyorderefthe Boeyl of Director* of sam c^orpor*> 
* » , and that they signed .their namea thereto by Eke order at Vice-President and Assistant Secretary, respocthrely, of thet Company. 
My commission expires the first day in Jaiy, A. IX 19.1W...-
(Signed) Herbe^.^.AUtt > „..„ 
Notary Public. 
Set 
(SEAL) 
STATE OF MARYLAND,C 1 
BALTIMORE CITY. J 
L R o b e r t H. B0U8e t Clerk of the Superior Court of Baltimore City, which Courtvk A 
Court of Record, and has a seal, do hereby certify that H e r b e r t J s A t O l • Esquire, before 
whom the annexed affidavits were made, and who haa thereto subscribed his name, was at die time of so doing a Notary Public of the 
* . t« «f Marrhmd. in and for the Oty of Baltimore, duly conunisaiooed and sworn and authored by law to administer otths and take 
! ^ o w l e ^ n Z or proof of deeds to be recorded therein. I further certify that I am acquainted with the handwriting of the aaid 
Notary, and verily bcBevt the signature to be hie genuine signature. 
lis Tertnumy WUrtolt I hereto set my hand and ami the seal of the Superior Court of Baltimore Gty, the same being a Court 
of Record, this l ? t h day of January .A. IX 1975 
i«M»4i *$»#.*•.*»&• s «•«« A V ft 
